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Introduction
A somewhat ambiguous term, 'smart city' is now at the vanguard of concepts concerning urban development, replacing and incorporating a series of precursors that included the wired city, the innovation city, digital city, the intelligent city, and the creative city (Hollands 2008; Kitchin 2014) . The term denotes something inherently positive, for who can be for the 'dumb city'? It also suggests more than the embedding of digital technologies in urban infrastructures and their deployment to manage cities more effectively, hinting at the clever entwining and integration of systems used to govern cities, enabling the 'breaking down of silos', 'joined-up thinking' and 'data-driven, real-time control', thus creating efficiencies and improved services. Importantly, the notion of a smart city is not confined to the operations of local government, with individuals gaining access to smartness through a plethora of smartphone-delivered industry-or citizencreated apps and services that provide information and enable choice and decision-making on the move, and privately delivered services (such as smart metering and smart parking). Data from these individuals, and the technologies they interact with, can in turn feedback into the operation of the city through citizen-sensing and crowdsourced reporting (Gabrys 2014).
While there is a relatively extensive literature concerning, on the one hand, the nature of smart cities in general terms and the roles of specific actors such as IBM (e.g., Hollands 2008; Townsend 2013; McNeill 2015; Söderström et al., 2015) , and on the other, the development and deployment of specific smart city technologies (e.g., urban operating systems, control rooms, smart grids, smart parking, smart waste management, sensor networks, smart lighting, etc.), to date there have been relatively few studies that have examined the situated practices as to how the smart city as a whole unfolds in specific places (Kitchin 2015) . Initial studies include Ayona Datta's (2015) examination of the formation of Dholera City in India; Alan Wiig's (2016) study of Philadelphia's smart city initiatives; Michelle Cullen's (2016) examination of Portland, Oregon and Dubuque, Iowa; Federico Cugurullo's (2016) research about the development of Masdar, UAE; and a number of studies of Songdo, South Korea (Carvalho 2012; Kim 2014; Shin et al. 2015; Shwayri 2013) . Interestingly, Dholera, Masdar and Songdo are all new, from-theground-up cities on greenfield sites. Moreover, both Wiig and Cullen's studies focus on the core role played by IBM in initiating smart city programmes. Studies focusing on the situated and contextual nature of smart city adoption in existing cities tend to focus on the rollout of specific initiatives and technologies, rather than mapping out the panoply of smart city initiatives and how they work (or not) in concert.
In this paper, we provide a mapping at a city scale of the various smart city initiatives underway, how they are managed and governed, and how they are corralled within a smart city framework. Such a mapping is important for four reasons. First, it reveals the diverse initiatives that make up a smart city and the different configurations of ICT instrumentation and regulation devices, policies and economic development strategies, and governance and civic engagement practices. Second, it highlights how 'smart city interventions are always the outcomes of, and awkwardly integrated into, existing social and spatial constellations of urban governance and the built environment' (Shelton et al. 2015: 14) . Despite the claims of multinational high-tech corporations that cities are a tabula rasa for innovation, smart city initiatives are layered onto or replace existing city systems and infrastructures, and fit within or rejig organisational structures and established modes of practice. Third, it exposes how the development of a smart city is far from stable and linear in nature, but rather unfolds through a set of contingent and relational processes shaped by local governance practices, political priorities, political economic context, and institutional settings. As such, the approach provides situated accounts of how smart cities emerge and are designed in practice. Fourth, it illustrates the role of new institutional bodies within and across local governments in organising and promoting the smart city agenda. Many cities have created new smart city units whose job it is to coordinate smart city initiatives across city departments and agencies, but to date the work of these units has been little documented.
Our empirical case is Dublin, Ireland, charting how Dublin has progressively framed and mobilised itself as a smart city. Our principle focus is 'Smart Dublin', the city-region's unit for coordinating, managing and promoting its smart city initiatives, and its formative phase in [2015] [2016] . In particular, we are interested in how Dublin evolved from what might be described, in Paul Dourish's (2016: 37) terms, as the 'accidental smart city' to an 'articulated smart city'. For Dourish, the: 'story of the accidentally smart city is not of one in which a single strategy and coherent design approach yields an urban space in which information is woven into the fabric.
Instead, the city becomes smart … [in a] piecemeal, gradual, disparate manner … little by little, one piece at a time, under the control of different groups, without a master plan, and with a lot of patching, hacking, jury-rigging and settling' (p. 37).
While the development of a smart city will always remain somewhat 'accidental', unfolding through a diverse set of initiatives driven by varying actors and stakeholders pursuing different interests, in the 'articulated smart city' existing initiatives are corralled into the semblance of an overarching, coordinated, strategic and branded narrative, into which future smart city initiatives are likewise folded. Smart Dublin is the vehicle for creating such an 'articulated smart city' in Dublin. It should be noted, however, that Dublin's path to becoming a smart city extends back much further than 2014. As we detail in a separate forthcoming paper, a clear path can be traced back from Smart Dublin to the innovation and creative city agenda of the 2000s, and to the entrepreneurial city agenda of the 1990s, in terms of the underpinning neoliberal ideology and some of the actors driving urban development in the city. While we are mindful of this longer trajectory, here we are more centrally interested in the period where the city self-declares itself 'smart' and the transition from an 'accidental' to 'articulated' smart city.
Our analysis is based on a detailed mapping of the smart city initiatives underway in Dublin in 2015 and a set of in-depth interviews and participant observation concerning the creation of Smart Dublin. The research started as a collaboration with Dublin City Council as a pre-cursor to the formation of Smart Dublin. The task was to conduct an audit of existing smart city-related initiatives in the four Dublin local authorities, to undertake interviews with those working on these initiatives to better understand their work, and to facilitate 'challenge' workshops in each of Dublin's four local authorities (LAs) to identify key issues that a smart city approach might address in the Dublin case. The challenge workshops were conducted in late 2015 and early 2016. Each workshop was opened by a presentation describing the regional scope of the initiative, the key concepts underpinning it, and the detailing the desire to identify existing smart city initiatives and 'challenges' which might be tackled to drive efficiencies and improve the lives of citizens. Participants then broke into groups of five to seven, with members from different background and competencies from across the organisation, and conducted two 40 minute sessions of group discussion and debate, moderated by a facilitator. The group discussions were structured around a fairly standard classification of smart city technologies developed by Giffinger and Pichler-Milanović (2007) and adopted by a number of bodies including the European Union and IEEE (see Table 1 ). The first session of each workshop sought to delineate understandings of what was meant by 'smart' from the participants, and then to collect examples of smart projects in their local authority based on the classification. During the second session, participants suggested and discussed new challenges. After the workshops, reports with feedback were prepared, followed by further stakeholder engagement to refine priority challenge areas and develop problem statements.
Following the workshops, we conducted 25 in-depth interviews with a selection of projects identified in the audit 1 . The initiatives selected were those that were already mainstreamed and used to deliver city services, and excluded pilot or terminated projects, or initiatives that were deemed extremely narrow in scale or serving a very limited audience. A further set of seven interviews were conducted for the launch of Smart Dublin to help write case studies for the Smart Dublin website and promotional material. Interviews typically lasted around an hour and were structured around a series of basic questions. Table 2 we highlight further the similarities and differences between the systems, noting whether they utilise sensor technologies, the extent to which they are automated, their generation/use of open data and data analytics, the means by which they are citizen engaged and the channels they employ, and the form of procurement adopted. Several of the projects incorporate networked sensors, forming part of the Internet of Things (IoT). These are more likely to involve forms of algorithmic decision-making, with varying degrees of human oversight and involvement. Being 'in the loop' refers to systems which identify and select profiles and targets, but which do not result in actions until a human manually approves; 'on the loop' is a system able to create actions based on its own analytic functions, but there is an operator in an oversight role that can intervene; and 'out of the loop' is a fully automated system that acts without human input (Citron and Pasquale 2014; Kitchin 2016 information systems across major providers. In addition, the initiatives are fragmented not only across LAs, but also across departments within those authorities. We interviewed a number of staff who did not know of other smart city systems in their own organisation. In other words, the systems we document were independently conceived and operated, procured or built to perform a particular task but outside of any wider smart city strategy.
As Paul Dourish (2016) argues, drawing on the work of Edwards and Grinter (2001) on the challenges of implementing ubiquitous computing more generally, Dublin had developed as 'accidentally smart', accreting slowly over time without much design intent, rather than being smart by design. Indeed, it should also be noted that many of systems detailed in Tables 1 and 2 were not initiated or funded under the rubric of smart cities and when we interviewed their staff they did not consider themselves to be part of a smart city endeavour, but rather working in IT, transport, waste management, etc. The four LAs, and the city more broadly, have acquired digital capacities slowly and accumulatively, with the various elements not designed to be part of a wider whole. Such accretion produces a certain path dependency and legacy systems that are not straightforward to append or replace.
The consequence of this fragmentation and diversity was that until 2015, Dublin, while deploying a number of smart city technologies, was not widely thought of as a smart city within Dublin or elsewhere (not appearing at the top of international rankings). This was made clear in the set of 42 interviews with stakeholders who were overwhelming in their view that Dublin was not a leader in becoming a smart city. For example:
'Well, I suppose I can think of plenty of cities that have done less and I can think of plenty of cities that have done more. I don't think I would say we are in the upper third to be honest … I think there aren't that many things you could say on the streets of Dublin that you'd be credible saying, 'we are a leader in smart cities'.' (DSC24, director, state agency)
'I wouldn't say Dublin is a smart city at all. I would say it wants to be perceived as a smart city and it is keen to be an early follower but it is not a leader in any way shape or form.' (DSC9, manager, civic organisation)
Interviewees noted that the smart city landscape was highly fragmented. is all these different groups doing really cool projects, but we are not all sitting down together seeing which are the best ones, which are really applicable now, which can we go with now? I used to think it was just bureaucracy but I think actually that it is fragmented. ' [SD3, project coordinator, university] Collectively, interviewees identified a wide-range of issues that they felt was holding
Dublin back from becoming a smart city, including:
 a piecemeal approach and a lack of a guiding strategy with associated mission and goals;
 an absence of joined-up thinking across LAs, their departments, and other stakeholders, and a preponderance of siloed-systems;
 weak governance structures and an absence of directed leadership;
 a lack of a formalised process of engagement between LAs, stakeholders and others;
 under-resourcing of investment and weak staffing and skills capacity;
 an imbalance in the capacity and enthusiasm for LAs and a lack of cooperation between LAs to create sufficient scales of economy;
 inflexibility in the working practices and a staid cultural mindset in LAs with respect to procurement, experimentation, and operations; and  too many political/regulatory barriers for implementation.
Nonetheless, the majority of interviewees also felt that the city was progressing and, moreover, that there were large opportunities to be gained from pursuing a smart city agenda.
For example:
'I don't think there is a city that is unbelievably advanced in this game, I think it is a real emerging space. That is why I think it is such a big opportunity for the city to really grab this by the neck and go for it with the right leadership, the right governance, and the right partners the opportunity is huge. … We seem to be moving faster than I thought we would and I think there is exciting initiatives and projects that are emerging or are under way. I think a lot of people would be jealous of the companies we have based here and I think maybe we could harness that a bit better in terms of the opportunity and the research and the products that they are contemplating.' (DSC1, LA worker)
Aware of the perception that the city-region was not a leader in smart cities and that there were potential opportunities to becoming a smart city and a perceived leader, the four local authorities took the collective decision in 2015 to create a smart city unit, articulate a new vision for Dublin as a smart city, and brand the city as 'Smart Dublin'. In so doing, it sought to start a shift from Dublin as an 'accidental' to 'articulated' smart city. It continues by arguing that the benefits accrued through Smart Dublin are that it: 'acts as a reference site to validate smart city technologies; move from research to reality; builds a collaboration framework to solve Dublin's challenges; delivers more efficient and responsive city services; increased engagement with citizens and service users; [and] enhances the quality of life.' Part of the narrative supporting the work of Smart Dublin is that local authorities are behind the technology-curve with respect to state-of-the-art ideas and systems for managing cities. They lack the core skills, knowledges, resources and capacities to address pressing urban issues and maintain critical services and infrastructures, which are becoming more socially and technically complex and require multi-tiered specialist interventions. Moreover, their procurement processes and regulations are outmoded and not fit for purpose. Instead, they need to draw on the competencies held within industry (such as large global consultancies and the producers of software and hardware solutions) that possess sufficient expertise to guide city administrators and can deliver better city services through public-private partnerships, leasing, deregulation and market competition, or outright privatization . Within this mindset, the place of the public sector is to challenge companies to offer solutions to set problems, and foster and connected as in a connected city (joined-up and networked). In particular, Smart Dublin has pursued four tactics designed to foster 'smartness', marking a significant change in how Dublin tackles urban issues and innovation.
First, it has sought to create a formalized approach to engagement with stakeholders and prepare a smart city strategy. Prior to the formation of Smart Dublin there was a sense that companies and universities were formulating initiatives and the city's administration was reactive to proposals, rather the four LAs driving the smart city agenda around their requirements and those of citizens. Moreover, there was no formalised process of engagement between stakeholders, with some having better access to decision-making networks than others, with decisions being made on an ad hoc basis. As detailed by two of our interviewees:
'I think it would be extremely difficult … to get into DCC. I think the rigidity of policies and procurement and stuff within the council is probably the weakest point in the smart cities thing, they are not flexible enough for it. … I personally have had dealings with the council and I personally have contacts in there and I know, not necessarily who I have to talk to, but I know who I have to ask to be told who I have to talk to, and most people in Dublin don't have that privilege. So, if you are not somebody who has had any interactions with them it is a very, very difficult place to put down any sort of a foothold.' (DSC12, leader, civic organisation)
'If you were IBM or Intel you can kind of walk through the front door but anybody else, they don't know the route or the procedure or...' (DSC23, local authority worker)
The result was a set of projects that suited stakeholders but little served the city, and which were implemented in an arbitrary way. In response to this, Smart Dublin now provides the four local authorities with a single point of contact for all smart city proposals -a 'front door' through which everyone enters -and a framing and procedure for evaluating each proposal in an equal and transparent manner. In November 2016 two sub-committees of the Smart Dublin steering group were formed to produce: (1) a formal procedure for engagement that sets out the process, timelines, and obligations with respect to Smart Dublin and those seeking engagement 7 ; (2) a draft smart city strategy for discussion at the next advisory network meeting. Smart Dublin has thus been a vehicle for the four LAs to take a more active role in shaping the smart city agenda for the city.
Second, it has embraced test-bedding as a means to undertake urban development. Testbedding is often synonymous with urban "living-labs" and has been introduced within engineering literature "to describe a controlled and often isolated development environment in which to test the operability of new technologies, processes, or theories for large systems" (Halpern et al., 2013) . Applied to cities, urban space becomes a distributed laboratory in which to test smart city technologies, especially those utilising IoT, creating test sites run by public and private stakeholder to help solve city challenges, but also to attract investment. In the Dublin case, the city allows an "exploration of smart city solutions in a space small enough to trial but large enough to prove" 8 .
Dublin hosts test-beds in several domains, including flood management, crowd management, air quality and sound monitoring, mobility, smart lighting, and low-power wide area networks. Larger initiatives include the Smart Stadium centred on Croke Park (an 80,000
seater venue) where a number of companies are trialling sensor and camera technologies for managing the stadium infrastructure, the pitch, concession stalls, and crowds, as well as the fan experience of an event (Panchanathan et al. 2016) The indefinite endpoint and progressive re-adaptation make test-bedding consistent with the future-oriented nature of Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP), particularly in the form of 'procurement by challenge' and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), which is the third tactic Smart Dublin is adopting. PCP has been recently adopted by the EU to foster ideas where a substantial amount of research and development is still needed to obtain a final product or service. 9 The process does not presuppose the optimal solution to a problem for which tenders are then sought, but rather seeks a range of solutions from which one will be selected. In many cases, an already established market solution does not exist, with the selected solution needing to be developed from an idea through to product. Usually the process is divided into four phases.
First, a 'challenge' is identified and a competition initiated. Second, the submitted solutions are evaluated and whittled down to four to six proposed solutions that the judging panel determine have potential value and utility. Each of the entities developing these solutions are given seed 9 "By definition, pre-commercial procurement is limited to the "pre-commercial" phase of an innovative product's lifecycle, while the commercialization phase is left in the hands of private firms and agents [...] This does not rule out the possibility (i) of a prototype or a test series being produced during the pre-commercial phase; and (ii) of the public procurer being among the purchasers of the commercialized good/service (or even the only purchaser, in the event of an exclusive development contractual clause)" (Petrella 2013). funding to continue to work on and prototype their solution. Third, a further round of judging takes place to identify the solution that is most likely to best address the challenge proposed. The successful initiative is given a further round of funding to develop their solution to a market product. Fourth, the LA decides whether to procure that product for mainstream use in the management of the city. Administered in this way, procurement by challenge acts as a stimulus to innovation, business and product creation. The project is inherently risky to both the procurer and developer as ultimately a solution for a problem might not be achieved. Despite this risk, the venture is considered worthwhile because it supports an innovation economy.
Smart Dublin has actively embraced the procurement by challenge approach to urban innovation and finding solutions to issues that Dublin faces. To fund PCP, Smart Dublin has successfully applied for SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) funds from Enterprise Ireland (the state agency responsible for developing and supporting indigenous companies).
SBIR operates under EU pre-commercial procurement rules and is a pan-government, structured process, enabling the public sector to engage with companies, especially start-up companies operating in the high-tech sector. 10 To date, one 'challenge' is significantly underway, focused on increasing cycling take-up in Dublin, making it safer, more sociable and secure. financing and implementing smart city technologies that work optimally at city-scale, rather than 10 SBIR (Rigby et al. 2012) aims to support the Public Sector to address challenges through innovation in products and services. SBIR projects are 100% funded, create a lead/R&D customer, provides accountability for funders and the IP is owned by companies that are free to develop and sell their innovations in global markets.
11 Out of the 93 application received, 21 have been audited, 5 selected for the first phase of funding (12.500 euros each) and 4 selected for the second phase of funding (25.000 euros each).
in localised areas. A further two scalar transformations are also occurring. The first is to an allisland scale through the All-Ireland Smart City Forum (launched December 9 th , 2016) that includes all the major cities of Ireland, and possibly those of Northern Ireland too, in order to share best practices, coordinate projects and tenders, and make collective bids for funding. The second is international and involvement in an EU H2020 project, an Urbact project (EU European Regional Develop Fund), a lead participant in a EU lighthouse project bid, and membership of TM Forum (an organisation that promotes the use of digital business in general across government, including smart cities) that involves collaboration with other city administrations in Europe and with businesses globally.
Thus conceived, Smart Dublin is an effort to coordinate, build and extend innovation networks in Dublin, closely linked to multinationals, the active start-up community, and statefunded drives to support local enterprises. Indeed, it is important to note that Smart Dublin has no control over the many smart city initiatives across the four local authorities. Rather its role is one of articulation (creating a smart city narrative and strategy), initiation (introducing and seeding new potential projects, partnerships, and systems into the four local authorities), and promotion (selling the idea that Dublin is a smart city and is open for smart city initiatives and businesses). These serve four main purposes. First, addressing and removing some of the barriers that were creating fragmentation and holding Dublin back from becoming a smart city, such as a lack of cooperation, joined-up thinking, weak governance and leadership, and an absence of formalized engagement. Second, creating, promoting and maintaining a discourse where private and civic initiatives in the Dublin region can coalesce. Third, putting Dublin 'on the map' of global smart cities. Fourth, providing a platform for engagement with new tendering practices.
From 'accidental to 'articulated' smart city?
At the time of writing, it is a year since Smart Dublin's formal launch and couple of years since its inception. In that time, with a small team and limited resources, Smart Dublin has started to shift Dublin from being a purely accidental smart city to an articulated one; that is, from a situation in which there were various disconnected and uncoordinated smart city initiatives, to one where there is a narrative placed around those initiatives and there is a unit whose role it is to envisage and help realise Dublin as a smart city. Its orientation to this process of articulation has very much been focused around economic and urban development, practising a form of tech-led innovation entrepreneurial urbanism in which city assets are used to increase competitiveness, attract inward investment, and foster indigenous start-ups and SMEs. In many senses, Smart
Dublin is remaking the actually existing accidental smart city in a new form through testbedding, can co-create and work with the State, deepening and further legitimating the marketization and public-private provision/privatization of city services and infrastructure. Rather than the city being a place which facilitates and hosts markets, with local government and state agencies being the main provider of services, the city itself becomes a market and corporate laboratory, with services increasingly being delivered privately. Such a repositioning raises the question of for whom is the smart city is being developed? What is the role of the State in urban development?
How does the smart city unfold in practice through public and private means? In the case of Smart Dublin these normative questions have little been considered or debated beyond formulating broad mission statements and goals. Rather the smart urban development agenda is being driven by a relatively narrow instrumental agenda aimed at addressing specific issues and fostering economic development.
While Smart Dublin professes to engage citizens, with citizens being considered its 'most important component', its focus on test-bedding and procurement by challenge has meant that in practice it has been almost exclusively engaged with companies, other state agencies, and departments in the LAs. Indeed, Smart Dublin has mostly been focused on building a platform to enable market collaboration and supporting economic growth and competitiveness. In part, the emphasis on economic development has been driven by a strong government emphasis on job creation and economic recovery post-financial crisis. Facilitating urban test-bedding is positioned as a strategic asset to attract inward investment and procurement by challenge is supported by a government funding stream. In addition, the loss of resources, staff and expertise within the public sector in the wake of the crisis necessitates a turn towards the market for ideas, labour and solutions. Given this limited capacity, the market is seen as a much more likely source for innovation and workable solutions than citizens. Moreover, given already existing relationships and the ecosystem of companies and incubators, engagement with the private sector is easier to manage and more straightforward. In contrast, interacting with citizens and civic associations is more complex.
In other words, there has been a pragmatic approach taken as to whom to engage with given government priorities and Smart Dublin's own limited capacity. This has meant that citizens are only the 'most important component' in the sense that ultimately, they will be the beneficiaries of the smart city -receiving better services. Indeed, the role of citizens in Smart
Dublin is presently one of user or consumer or tester, but not consultant, participant, proposer, co-creator or decision-maker. Indeed, to date there has been little attempt to actively engage citizens with respect to Smart Dublin's work: there is no sense that test-bedding has been undertaken in partnership with local communities or that citizens are actively consulted in identifying the challenges to be addressed through the SBIR programme. As such, with regards to citizens Smart Dublin has defaulted to operating a form of civic paternalism and stewardship deciding on what is best for and acting on behalf of citizens (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2017) . And despite the ambition to become more citizen-centric, the marginal status of citizens in creating the smart city is likely to remain in the absence of additional capacities and competencies of Smart Dublin to engage meaningfully with them, or an agenda driven by normative rather than instrumental concerns.
While Smart Dublin spans the four local authorities and in principle could act as a coordinator of smart city initiatives within and across these bodies, to date it has concentrated its focus on creating connections with and between companies and university research institutes. In this sense, it has created connections, but they are outward facing linkages rather than inward.
Moreover, given the heterogeneity of actors (start-ups, corporations, public agencies, universities, etc.) , the mutable nature of markets, and the lack of capacity and leadership, rather than a producing a highly and tightly connected network Smart Dublin works within a loosely coupled ecosystem (Weick 1995) . Such an ecosystem is characterised as being without central coordination nor strict rules, where there are many solutions to challenges, processes are distributed in a dense network of connections, and feedback is not immediate. Smart Dublin seeks to be a facilitator within these loose couplings, organizing and sponsoring meetings, running events and schemes, providing funding and space, and acting as a broker between actors.
It makes Dublin's ecosystem visible and at the same time acts as a platform for it. However, the looseness of arrangements mean that the network lacks coordination and direction, meaning that how the activities unfold can be haphazard and dependent on particular individuals rather than structures and formalised processes. As such, the scale and success of initiatives is variable according to the relations and actors that are activated around specific challenges, technologies and solutions.
One issue that is significantly shaping the formation and geography of new smart city initiatives in the city is a large imbalance in the enthusiasm, commitment and resourcing by the four LAs. While each local authority has smart city initiatives, DCC has by far the most number of staff interested in and actively applying the smart city approach, and the greatest number of projects and connections with companies. They were the initiators of test-bed urbanism within the city as well as of the pre-commercial forms of procurement, and are driving those agendas.
They are also the largest and wealthiest LA given the business rates generated by the city centre location. What this has meant is that Smart Dublin is dominated by DCC and the organisation sometimes suffers with the associated politics and disharmony that go with this imbalance, such as difficulties in agreeing on courses of action.
The orientation of Smart Dublin towards economic development and innovation has meant Dublin is being articulated as a smart city in particular way. However, while the approach adopted produces a narrative of Dublin as a smart city and has been successful in terms of encouraging innovation, building relationships with companies and universities, and starting to establish an international profile needed to secure large-scale EU smart city funding, it does very little to address the accidental nature of existing smart city initiatives, which remain largely disconnected and uncoordinated. Moreover, somewhat ironically, the approach of using testbedding and new forms of procurement further produces a fragmented landscape of everevolving projects and initiatives that are in continual flux. These testbed and procurement related projects possess coordination in so much as they are facilitated by Smart Dublin, but they are not interlinked through some grand design or master plan that addresses issues of interoperability between systems and alignment of work and processes with existing initiatives. Indeed, most are pilot projects that will not be mainstreamed in the short term. Further, while new forms of procurement potentially make the public sector more agile and responsive to market solutions, it also makes it more fragile in two ways. First, it further delegate responsibility for the delivery of city services to the private sector. Second, due to their reliance on networked software, the technical solutions procured are potentially insecure, brittle and open to hacking (Kitchin and Dodge 2017) . As such, Dublin is set to continue being an accidental smart city, albeit one whose accidental nature is veiled by Smart Dublin. In this regard, it will not be exceptional. As Paul Dourish (2016) notes, every city is an accidental smart city, though some are more articulated, and some more coordinated, than others.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the accidental nature of smart city development and how the diverse processes and initiatives of smart cities are corralled within an articulated narrative to produce a more coherent sense of the smart city landscape forming. Our case example has been Dublin, Ireland, and the formation of Smart Dublin, a unit co-owned by four LAs whose remit is to articulate a smart city narrative and strategy, initiate new projects and partnerships and attract funding and inward investment, and promote the work of the Dublin LAs within and beyond
Ireland with respect to smart cities. As with all existing cities that are utilising ICT in their management and governance and delivery of city services and infrastructures, our mapping of the various smart city initiatives at work in Dublin reveals that they were deployed in an ad hoc, piecemeal, uncoordinated manner. There was no smart city master plan. In fact, there was very little coordination or even awareness of initiatives across departments with LAs or between LAs.
Smart Dublin has sought, in part, to address this accidental nature and to create a more articulated and coordinated smart city landscape. However, while Smart Dublin has been successful in creating a smart city narrative and branding Dublin as a smart city, it has taken a very particular path in this process, focusing strongly on economic and urban development. To a large degree, Smart Dublin operates as an economic support unit, forming partnerships with companies and universities to facilitate urban testbedding and attract inward investment, and experimenting with procurement by challenge to foster innovation, new smart city products, and new business formation. It has little addressed the existing accidental and uncoordinated nature of Dublin as a smart city and in many ways actively contributes to that accidental nature through proliferating smart city projects that are largely uncoordinated and non-interoperable beyond a shared, overarching narrative. The accidental smart city then continues to be produced, despite the attempts to create a more articulated vision.
The contribution of this analysis to understanding the smart city is threefold. First, we have demonstrated the importance of mapping the whole smart city landscape within an urban domain. Such a mapping reveals that despite the rhetoric of smart city initiatives breaking down silos and producing more coordinated, integrated city services, in reality initiatives are largely conceived and built in a gradual, piecemeal manner by different parties, and are deployed under the control of varying actors. Few cities so far have developed smart city strategies or masterplans, and despite the projected hopes of urban operating systems, integrated control rooms, and smart city standards initiatives, the smart city will largely continue, we believe, to be accidental rather than by design. No doubt, integrating solutions, standards and strategies will produce a degree of coordination and interoperability, but it will not be able to tame and corral all the stakeholders, actors and technologies at play in the city into a unified whole. As such, the articulated smart city will always to be that, an articulation: a narrative to create a particular impression and to attract attention and investment. It will always remain to some degree accidental.
Second, we have demonstrated the role of the political and administrative geography of a city in the development of smart cities. In particular, we have highlighted how the fragmented nature of Dublin's local government into four autonomous jurisdictions contributed to the accidental nature of its smart city initiatives. The solution to this fractious governance was the formation of a unit that cut across all four LAs, with a shared budget and staff. However, while the unit does overarch the LAs, it has no executive powers of coordination, only able to lobby LA departments to embrace the ideas and ideals of smart cities and use Smart Dublin to promote Dublin as a smart city. To date, there has been very little political geography analysis of the smart city beyond a number of studies that examined the modes of governmentality enacted through smart city technologies (e.g., Klauser et al. 2014; Vanolo 2014; Sadowski and Pasquale 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2016) . And yet it is clear that the administrative geography can have a profound effect on the deployment of smart city technologies that need to work at scale or across stakeholders. For example, transport solutions such as integrated smart ticketing, smart parking and bike-share need to cover entire functional territories and all suppliers. It is unfeasible that citizens would be expected to transfer between different bike systems at municipal boundaries or have different smart cards for different transport providers. Moreover, it means that there can marked differences in the smart city services that citizens have access to in different jurisdictions. This is the case in Dublin, but is particularly striking in another of our case studies, where the number and scope of smart city initiatives across the 101 municipalities in the Greater Boston area is highly uneven and there is little to no cooperation and sharing between jurisdictions. In part, this issue has been ignored because studies have focused on single technologies within single jurisdictions.
Third, we have documented the process by which an accidental smart city starts to become an articulated one and the role played by specialist smart city units. Smart Dublin's role is explicitly to produce a smart city strategy and narrative, to liaise and work with companies, universities and other LA departments and public sector agencies, and to seek new solutions for issues facing LAs and citizens; it is to create an articulated smart city. It is highly active in this regard, acting as a key node in the advocacy coalition for smart cities operating in the city, and liasing and working with international partners. Given limited resources and a wider context of government prioritising job creation and the priorities of companies, Smart Dublin is pursuing becoming an articulated smart city through an economic development agenda that utilises test-bedding and procurement by challenge, but as yet pays little attention to meaningful citizen engagement. As a shared unit across four LAs, Smart Dublin is somewhat pioneering in the Dublin context, creating a distinct form of governance. The unit has quickly gained visibility across departments in the four LAs though the challenge workshops it has organized, and it has gained some international visibility. It acts a conduit for mobile policy concerning smart cities into the four LAs and as a broker for projects between stakeholders and LAs.
It is clear from our analysis that to more fully understand the rollout of smart city initiatives around the world there is a need for two complementary sets of studies that supplement the raft of studies focusing on the rollout of specific technologies or initiatives in particular locations. First, there needs to be empirical case studies of the evolving smart city landscape across entire city-regions, the interrelationships between smart city initiatives, the role of political and administrative geographies in shaping the development of the actually existing smart city, and the formation and work of smart city units. Clearly, such research can draw on the rich tradition of urban policy and practice research to contextualise and help make sense of what is the same or different about the drive to create smart cities. Second, there needs to be a set of comparative studies examining how the smart city landscape is taking shape in different cities around the world and starts to make sense of general patterns and localised contingencies. It is clear from the analysis conducted to date that the creation of smart cities has taken different paths and forms across the globe, varying as a function of political, economic and legal context, culture, governance, legacy infrastructures, policy priorities, administrative geographies, and interconnections and interdependencies with other places. Little is known, as yet, as to the specificities of these differences and their effects, and yet smart city technologies are still being developed and marketed as universal solutions to urban issues.
